Abstract: In a fingerprinting scheme, a distributor places marks in each copy of a digital object. Placing different marks in different copies uniquely identifies the recipient of each copy, and therefore allows tracing of the source of an unauthorised redistribution. A widely used approach to the fingerprinting problem is the use of error correcting codes with a suitable large minimum distance. With this approach, the set of embedded marks in a given copy is precisely a code word of the error correcting code. We present two different approaches that use side information for the tracing process. The first approach deals uses the Guruswami -Sudan errors-and-erasures list decoding algorithm whereas the second approach shows the use of a full side information matrix.
Introduction
With the increasing availability of copying devices for digital data, the need to restrain illegal redistribution of multimedia objects is becoming an important issue. The mechanisms used in protecting intellectual property can be classified in two groups: copy prevention mechanisms and copy detection mechanisms. The failure of copy prevention schemes, such as the DVD copy prevention system, has shifted many research efforts towards the search of feasible copy detection mechanisms. These efforts have brought the development of new proposals of copy detection systems for many different types of digital content.
A large number of these new proposals can be grouped under the name of watermarking. The watermarking technique consists of embedding a set of marks in each copy of the digital content. Since the embedded set of marks is the same for all copies, watermarking schemes ensure intellectual property protection but fail to protect distribution rights.
If protection against distribution rights is also required then the concept of watermarking needs to be extended further off. The functionality of watermarking can be extended by allowing the embedded set of marks to be different in each copy of the object. This true original idea was introduced by Wagner in [1] and is called fingerprinting (because of its analogy to human fingerprints). The copies of a digital object obtained under a fingerprinting scheme are, of course, all different. Having distinct copies of the same object univocally identifies the buyer of a copy and therefore allows to trace illegal plain redistribution.
Therefore if a user redistributes his fingerprinted object without modification, he can be incriminated in an unambiguous way. Nevertheless, a group of dishonest users, called traitors, can collude to create a pirate copy that hides their identities, by comparing their copies. If the set of marks to be embedded are the code words of an error correcting code, it is possible to obtain efficient algorithms to trace the traitors.
If the code is secure against a coalition of size c, it is called a c-secure code. A c-secure code guarantees that at least one of the members of the coalition can be traced. It is worth to keep in mind that, if a fingerprinting scheme uses a c-secure code, and more than c traitors collude, then tracing even one of them will not in general be possible. An even worse situation is when the number of colluders exceeds the security capacity of the code they can even incriminate an innocent user. Therefore when designing a fingerprinting scheme, the number of colluders it needs to be robust against is an important matter.
In the literature on both fingerprinting codes and traceability schemes, the problem is considered to be solved if at least one of the c colluders is traced. However, in many cases, more than one traitor can be unambiguously traced and this is precisely the key issue of this paper: how to efficiently trace as many traitor users as possible.
If the code is a traceability c-TA code, then it is c-secure and the traitor tracing algorithm reduces to search for the code words that agree in most symbol positions with the pirate, in a sense to be precised below. For this search, list decoding algorithms are optimal when all traitors contribute with the same amount of information in the construction of the pirate copy. The use of soft-decision list decoding allows extending the tracing capabilities. We present two different approaches, whose output is a list containing all traitors that have positively been involved in the construction of the pirate: † For traceability q-ary Reed -Solomon codes we use several iterations of the Guruswami -Sudan errors-anderasures decoding algorithm. The output of one decoding is changed into side information that is used as the input to the next decoding. † For a binary two-secure code with error e we use the Guruswami-Sudan weighted list decoding algorithm. In a concatenated construction, information from the inner code is converted to a reliability matrix used to decode the outer code.
Related work
The idea of error correcting codes having traceability properties, as discussed, is because of the work of Chor et al. in [2] , and Boneh and Shaw in [3] .
The collusion attack introduced above is modelled by the following marking assumption: in the positions where they detect a mark, the colluders have to choose between placing one of their marks or making the mark unreadable, whereas all the undetected marks will remain unchanged. This marking assumption is extended in [4] , by allowing some of the undetected marks to also be erased.
The previous marking assumption is assumed in [3, 5 -7] , and in almost all of the work that deals with traceability from an information-theory, media-independent point of view, as this paper does. The interaction between coding and embedding (especially the impact on marking assumptions as discussed in Section 4.1), and a discussion of how to consider the two aspects together can be found in [8, 9] . A more general and broader discussion on data hiding codes is provided in [10] .
In [3] , Boneh and Shaw provided a concatenated construction with a nice asymptotical behaviour by concatenating an inner c-secure code with an outer random code. However, because of the random nature of the outer code, this construction does not have any polynomial complexity time decoding algorithm, thus limiting their practical applications for a large value of the number of users.
Moreover, we present a fingerprinting concatenated code code construction that is close to the results of Barg et al. in [5] . However, our approach is slightly different, whereas in [5] elegant and general results are given, we focus on a particular code construction for the case of traitor coalitions of size 2, which allows us to devise a slightly more efficient decoding process. More precisely, we discuss a concatenated construction consisting of a dual binary Hamming code as the inner code, and a Reed-Solomon code as the outer code. In their work, Barg et al. took advantage of the (2, 2)-separability property of the inner code. Unfortunately, using such an inner code requires a brute force search throughout the code in the decoding process. By using a dual binary Hamming code, we take advantage of the structure of the code and decode using a modified version of the Chase algorithms as can be seen below, and in more detail in [11] .
Introductory example
This paper discusses the identification (tracing) process in traitor tracing and fingerprinting schemes that are implemented using codes with traceability properties. More precisely, if the underlying code of the scheme is an error correcting code, we show how soft-decision decoding techniques can be used to efficiently trace the guilty users.
Before we get into technical matters we give an intuitive overview, in the form of an example, of the algorithms discussed in this paper. By doing this at the beginning of the paper, we try to separate the concepts from where the algorithms emanate from the intrinsic mathematical development and also hopefully provide the reader of an extra motivation for going deep into our results.
The scenario we will deal with is the following one. A distributor D, that sells digital content, wishes to discourage illegal redistribution of his products. To this end, he embeds a unique set of symbols in each copy of the content before it is delivered. This makes each copy unique and therefore if a dishonest user illegally redistributes his copy, he can be unambiguously identified by the simple extraction of the set of symbols.
A weakness of this scheme comes in the form of a collusion attack. This attack consists in two or more users getting together and by comparing their copies they detect the positions in which their copies differ. With this knowledge they create a new copy that in every detected position contains a symbol of one of the members of the coalition. This new copy is a pirate copy that tries to disguise the identity of the guilty users and is the one they illegally redistribute.
With the above scenario in mind, it is clear that the distributor D, has to embed into the content, sets of symbols that are secure against collusion attacks. One way to obtain such sets is as follows.
Suppose we wish to obtain a collection of sets of symbols C, which is secure against traitor coalitions of two users. Furthermore, we impose that the symbols are taken from an alphabet F of size 16. We also impose that the sets of symbols are of length 15 and are ordered, so we can refer to them as 15-tuples.
The guilty coalition will consist of users a and b whose copies contain the 15-tuples a ¼ (a 1 , a 2 , a 3 , . . . , a 15 ) and
According to the marking assumption, we are considering that we can construct a pirate z as follows
where z clearly contains eight symbols from a and seven symbols from b. Now, given z, we need to establish a criterion for traitor identification. The first one that probably comes into mind is that among all the 15-tuples in C, a and b are the ones that agree in most positions with z. Therefore any other 15-tuple, say u, from C, can only agree with z in at most six positions. By the construction of z one immediately sees that a necessary condition in this case is that u can only agree in at most three positions with either a or b. In other words, any two 15-tuples from C must be different in at least 12 positions.
Summarising we require that the 15-tuples in C have pairwise minimum distance at least 12. If we take F to be the field F 16 then a Reed -Solomon [2, 10, 12] code fully satisfies all our requirements.
From the above reasoning, we have that a Reed -Solomon [2, 10, 12] code can be used in a traitor tracing (fingerprinting) scheme that can accommodate 50 625 users and is totally secure against collusion attacks performed by coalitions of size 2. Moreover, given a pirate tuple we can positively identify as traitors all code words that agree with the pirate in seven or more positions. (How to efficiently do this identification is discussed by Silverberg et al. in the elegant paper [6] ). Now suppose that again a and b conform the traitor coalition. Of course now we take a and b to be code words from a Reed -Solomon [2, 10, 12] code. The pirate z they now construct contains 11 symbols from a and 4 symbols from b. In this case, we immediately identify a as a traitor since agrees with z in more than seven positions.
But what about b? From our previous reasoning it seems that he is out of reach of our tracing capabilities and cannot be identified. But all is not lost as we now see. Once a is identified there are four positions in z whose contribution comes from a single code word (since the code is only secure against collusions of size 2), therefore since any two code words only agree in at most three positions, there is a unique possibility for the second traitor, which of course is b, that is therefore unambiguously identified.
Below we formalise these ideas (see Theorem 5 and its corollary) and show that tracing the traitors can be done in an efficient manner by using the most simple soft-decision decoding technique, namely error-and-erasure (list) decoding. Also since the most interesting fingerprinting codes are binary, we also give a construction of a binary fingerprinting code and show that the identification process can be done using a soft-decision algorithm that takes as its input a side information matrix (see Section 2, Theorem 4, Section 5).
Organisation of the paper
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 gives the required background in coding theory and traceability codes. An errors-and-erasures soft-decision tracing algorithm is presented in Section 3. The errors-and-erasures tracing algorithm is extended to traceability codes tolerating unreadable symbols in Section 4. In Section 5, we present the construction of a binary fingerprinting code and show how soft-decision decoding can also be used in the tracing process. We present our conclusions in Section 6.
2
Background on coding theory and traceability codes 2.1 Codes and traceability codes 2.1.1 Reed -Solomon codes: We use the terminology in [12] to describe traceability codes. Let F q n be a vector space, then C # F q n is called a code. The set of symbols, For a linear [n, k, d ]-code C, we have that the inequality d n 2 k þ 1 always holds. This inequality is called the Singleton bound [13] . Codes with equality in the Singleton bound are called maximum distance separable codes or just MDS codes. A well-known class of linear MDS codes are Reed -Solomon codes, which can be defined as follows:
Take n distinct elements P ¼ fn 1 , . . . , n n g # F q . Then a Reed -Solomon code of length n and dimension k consists of all the code words ( f (n 1 ), . . . , f(n n )) where f takes the value of all polynomials of degree less than k in ] code, consisting of 0 and 2 r 2 1 code words of weight 2 r21 , with every pair of code words the same distance apart.
Traceability codes:
is any subset of code words, the set of descendants of C 0 , denoted as desc c (C 0 ), is defined as
The symbol f?g denotes an unreadable mark.
For a code C and an integer c ! 2, let C i # C, i ¼ 1, 2, . . . , t be all the subsets of C such that jC i j c. Definition 1: Let C be a code, then C is a c-traceability (c-
Note that in the language of Section 1.2, the descendant defined in this section corresponds to the pirate copy and the set parents correspond to the traitor coalition.
c-secure codes:
A code is totally c-secure, if given a descendant of a coalition of size at most c, there exists a tracing algorithm that allows to find one member of the coalition with probability 1.
Since there are no totally binary c-secure codes for c ! 2 [3] (Theorem 4.2 of that paper), then for the binary case the goal is to construct codes that allow to at least identify one member of the coalition with probability greater than 1 2 e. Such codes are denoted as c-secure codes with e-error.
The following result is a classic and will be needed below. Suppose we have a dual binary Hamming code S r with parameters [2 r 2 1, r, 2 r21 ], if v belongs to the descendant code S r Ã , then there are three possibilities for the sets of pairs of parents:
1. A star configuration. All pairs of parents have a common element, say x, where dist(x, v) 2 r22 2 1. 2. A 'degenerated' star configuration. There is a single parent pair fx, yg.
3. A triangle configuration. There are three possible pairs of parents: fx, yg, fx, zg and f y, zg.
Guruswami -Sudan errors-and-erasures decoding algorithm
Before dwelling into the discussion of the tracing process, we note that our algorithms will make use of the breakthrough results on list decoding by Guruswami and Sudan [15] , so a brief presentation of these results is in order.
When a code word is transmitted through a communications channel, the received word is usually a corrupted version of the sent code word because of the inherent presence of noise in the channel. If the number of errors e is greater than bd 2 1/2c, then there can be more than one code word within distance e from the received word and the decoder may either decode incorrectly or fail to decode. This leads to the concept of list decoding [15] , where the decoder outputs a list of all code words within distance e of the received word, thus offering a potential way to recover from errors beyond the error correction bound of the code.
In soft-decision decoding, the decoding process takes advantage of 'side information' generated by the receiver and instead of using the received word symbols, the decoder uses probabilistic reliability information about these received symbols.
The most simple form of soft-decision decoding is called errors-and-erasures decoding. An erasure is an indication that the value of a received symbol is in doubt. In this case, when dealing with a q-ary transmission, the decoder has (q þ 1) output alternatives: the q symbols from F q , g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g q and f * g, where the symbol f * g denotes an erasure.
Theorem 3 [15] : The list decoding problem for [n, k, d ] Reed -Solomon codes allowing for e errors and s erasures can be solved in polynomial time, provided
Soft decision Guruswami -Sudan list decoding algorithm
In many applications [16] the input to the decoder is a matrix of reliability information. Typically this matrix is a q Â n matrix, R ¼ [r ij ], where each row represents a symbol of the code alphabet and each column represents a code word position. The entry r ij contains probabilistic information about the ith alphabet symbol being the one sent in the jth position. Of course we are first interested in how the GuruswamiSudan algorithm behaves when its input is a matrix like the one described above. It is our aim to do it now using the elegant notation introduced by Koetter and Vardy in [17] .
With this intention, given two q Â n matrices A and B over the same field, the following product is defined
Theorem 4 [15, 17] : Reed -Solomon soft-decision decoding: If code word u is transmitted and R is a q Â n matrix with non-negative real entries, then the GS softdecision decoding algorithm outputs a list that contains the sent code word u [ RS(n, k) if
where o(1) is a function that tends to zero in the asymptotic case. We note that the previous theorem is a generalisation of Theorem 3, as we now show.
Suppose that, as in Section 2.2, we receive a word v that contains s erasures. In this case, we construct the matrix R ¼ (r ij ), as follows
According to (4) code word u, that contains e errors in the non-erased positions, will be returned by the GS soft-decision list decoding algorithm if
since kR, Rl ¼ 1. Note that is precisely (1). Remark: We think that at this stage a brief explanation is needed to clarify things. At the beginning of this last subsection we stated that typically the entries r ij in the matrix R contain probabilistic information about the ith alphabet symbol being the one sent in the jth position. Note, however, that in Theorem 4 Guruswami and Sudan state that only a matrix with non-negative real entries is needed with no further restrictions, since the decoding problem they solve is an interpolation problem in nature (see [15] for more details). Therefore it is perfectly possible to define the entries in the matrix such as in (5), in other words, that the entries columns do not sum up to 1. By doing this we are simply normalising the product ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi kR, Rl p so it evaluates to 1. Note that then, the reasoning that leads to (6) makes sense.
Errors-and-erasures tracing process
Having presented the GS error-and-erasures list decoding algorithm, we discuss how to use it in the tracing process. For a c-TA Reed -Solomon code, the goal of a tracing algorithm is to output a c-bounded list that contains all parents of a given descendant. We cannot expect to find all parents, since some of them may contribute with too few positions and cannot be traced. This happens, for example, when a parent contributes with only k 2 1 positions where k is the dimension of the code. So given a descendant, we call any code word that is involved in the construction of the descendant in an unambiguous way a positive parent.
The condition for a code word to be a positive parent is given in Theorem 5 below.
Lemma 1: Let C be a c-traceability Reed -Solomon code. Given a descendant there always exists a code word in C that agrees with the descendant in at least c(k 2 1) þ 1 positions.
Proof: Since there are at most c parents, one of them must contribute with at least dn/ce symbols in the creation of the descendant, so it suffices to prove that c(k 2 1) þ 1 dn/ce. Since d . n 2 n/c 2 this is clearly the case. 
A For a code word u and a descendant z the set M(u, z) ¼ fi : u i ¼ z i g is called the set of matched positions. Now we have the following corollary.
Corollary 1: Let C be a c-traceability Reed -Solomon code with parameters [n, k, d ]. Let z be a descendant of some coalition. Suppose that j already identified positive parents ( j , c) jointly match less than n 2 (c 2 j)(k 2 1) positions of z, then any code word that agrees with z in at least (c 2 j)(k 2 1) þ 1 of the unmatched positions is also a positive parent.
Intuitively our algorithm works as follows:
Since given a descendant word there is no side information available, we apply the errors-and-erasures GS list decoding to the descendant.
Once some positive parents are identified, the algorithm computes the number of remaining parents to be found. All symbol positions where these already identified parents match the descendant are erased. Another run of the GS algorithm is made. This step is repeated until it becomes clear that there are no more positive parents. 
) output L and quit. 8. else erase the positions in z corresponding to M i ) z U zj positions in M i erased and go to step 2.
Correctness of the algorithm
To prove the correctness of the algorithm we must show that all positive parents are identified in step 4.
If we view the construction of a descendant as the transmission of a codeword, we can say that the 'errors in the transmission' are the number of positions in which a positive parent and the descendant differ. Then given a code word c and a descendant z and using the notation in Section 2.2, we have that the quantity n 2 (s þ e) is precisely the number of positions in which c and z agree.
Using (1) we have that the GS errors-and-erasures algorithm returns all code words that
In iteration i, there can be at most c i ¼ c 2 i unidentified parents. We will proceed as follows. First note that as the algorithm iterates, symbols of the descendant are erased. Since the number of the symbols we have to erase depends entirely on how the descendant is constructed, we will consider two cases for convenience. On one hand we will assume that the number of non-erased symbols (n 2 s) is n 2 s c i [c i (k 2 1) þ 1] and on the other hand we will suppose that (n 2 s) is n 2 s .
We first suppose that the number of non-erased symbols (n 2 s) is n 2 s c i [c i (k 2 1) þ 1]. Then Corollary 1 states that a codeword that agrees with a descendant in at least (c 2 j)(k 2 1) þ 1 of the unmatched positions is also a positive parent, in other words, in n 2 (s þ e) ! c i (k 2 1) þ 1 of the non-erased symbols, so
we have that (7) is satisfied, and all positive parents are in the output list of the algorithm. Now we suppose that n 2 s .
. In this case, there exists a positive parent, such that the number of agreements with the descendant (n 2 (s þ e)) is at least (n 2 s)/c i . For this particular parent we have that
Again it follows that (7) is satisfied and therefore this parent is identified. Note that at this point, we can turn at least (n 2 s)/c i positions into erasures. This is the reason for the inner loop in step 5. With each iteration of this inner loop we can increase in at least j w d(n 2 s)/c i e the number of erased positions of the descendant. From the point of view of another positive parent, say u, this means that
Using the same procedure as above, we have that
It follows that again (7) is satisfied, so all positive parents in this step are also identified. Errors-and-erasures tracing of traceability codes tolerating unreadable positions
Extension of the marking assumption
We now model the collusion attack by the following marking assumption [3] : in the positions where they detect a mark, the colluders have to choose between placing one of their marks or making the mark unreadable, whereas all the undetected marks will remain unchanged. This marking assumption is extended in [4] by allowing some of the undetected marks to also be made unreadable. In both cases it is clear that as before, upon finding a pirate copy, the goal of the distributor is to identify as many traitors as possible.
To see the motivation for our tracing algorithm, consider the following scenario from [7] . The distributor assigns a code word from a q-ary fingerprinting code to each user. To embed the code word into each users object, the object is first divided into blocks. The distributor then picks a set of these blocks at random. This set of blocks is kept secret and will be the same for all users. Then using a watermarking algorithm a mark of the fingerprint code word is embedded in each block. Note that a given user will have one of the q versions of the block.
The colluding traitors compare their copies, detect the blocks where their copies differ and with this information at hand, they construct a pirate copy where each block belongs to the corresponding block of one of the traitors. Since each mark is embedded using a different random sequences and these sequences are unknown to the traitors, they cannot create a version of the block that they do not have, but they can modify the block as to make the mark unreadable. This is a q-ary version of Guth and Pfitzmann's marking assumption [4] . See [7] for more details.
If the fingerprinting code is a traceability code tolerating unreadable marks, then tracing the traitors can be successful provided the number of unreadable positions is bounded and it reduces to search for the code words that agree in most symbol positions with the pirate.
Errors-and-erasures tracing algorithm tolerating unreadable marks
The conditions for a code word to be a positive parent in the case of tolerance to unreadable marks are given in the following theorem and its corollary. Proof: If there are no unreadable positions in the descendant, then s ¼ 0 and from the proof of Theorem 5, we have that the number of positions in which a descendant and a code word not in the coalition that created the descendant agree, is at most c(k 2 1). Unreadable symbols in the descendant (at most s) only makes this number smaller.
From the above reasoning, and again from the proof of Theorem 5, it follows that any code word that agrees with the descendant in at least c(k 2 1) þ 1 of the readable positions is a positive parent. A Corollary 2: Let C be a c-traceability Reed -Solomon code tolerating s unreadable marks with parameters [n, k, d ], and let z be a descendant of some coalition, having s unreadable marks. Suppose that j already identified positive parents ( j , c) jointly match less than n 2 s 2 (c 2 j)(k 2 1) positions of z, then any code word that agrees with z in at least (c 2 j)(k 2 1) þ 1 of the unmatched positions is also a positive parent. The development of the following algorithm follows the one given previously in Section 3, with the exception that, since the descendant may have some unreadable marks, we will treat these unreadable marks as erasures right at the initialisation step of the algorithm.
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